In the fall of 1923, the German crisis following the First World War reached its peak. The passive resistance to the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, which the Reich government had called for at the beginning of the year, was financed by the money printing press and resulted in the already advancing currency devaluation entering the stage of hyperinflation: Large swathes of the middle class lost their life savings and unemployment rose sharply. When the new Reich government under Chancellor Stresemann was forced to call off the ‘Ruhrkampf‘ (a nonviolent resistance campaign against the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr region in Germany in 1923) at the end of September, this resulted in a wave of protests from the nationalist right.
In Bavaria, Hitler took over the political leadership of the German Combat League, a merger of the Nazi Party and extreme right-wing paramilitary associations, and at the beginning of October there was an attempted putsch by radical right-wing Reichswehr reservists in Küstrin and Spandau. On the other hand, the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) tried to use the profound crisis for an insurrectionary movement. In Hamburg, an attempted communist insurrection failed at the end of October; however, the entry of communist ministers into the Social Democratic Party-led governments of Thuringia and Saxony and the increasing radicalism of the working class there gave rise to fears that central Germany could become the basis for a far more extensive left-wing extremist uprising. Additionally, there were separatist movements in the Rhineland and the Palatinate that proclaimed independent ‘republics‘.
In response to the ‘Ruhrkampf’ being called off and the resulting unrest in right-wing extremist circles - there were particular fears of a coup by the Combat League - the Bavarian government declared a state of emergency on September 26, 1923 and appointed the former right-wing conservative State Premier Gustav von Kahr as General State Commissioner with dictatorial powers. The Reich government then declared its own state of emergency. In this conflict, the commander of the Reichswehr divisionstationed in Bavaria, Otto von Lossow, refused to obey Berlin and was subsequently called to duty with his troops by the Bavarian government. In Bavaria in October 1923, a right-wing conservative camp and an extreme right-wing camp faced each other, pursuing similar political goals but rivaling each other fiercely: On the one hand, General State Commissioner von Kahr, supported primarily by the ‘state commander‘ von Lossow and the chief of the state police Hans von Seißer; on the other, the Combat League with its leading figures Ludendorff, Hitler and Röhm.
Both camps wanted to overthrow the Stresemann government and replace it with a dictatorial regime: The Combat League intended first to proclaim a dictatorship under Ludendorff/Hitler in Munich, then to violently eliminate the socialist governments in central Germany and finally to set out on a ‘March on Berlin‘ in order to seize power there. Von Kahr also wanted to see the Reich government in Berlin replaced by a ‘directorate‘ with dictatorial powers; however, he primarily relied on exerting enough pressure together with right-wing North German circles and the Reichswehr to achieve the desired changes by means of a cold ‘coup d’état’. In the meantime, the ‘Bavarian‘ Reichswehr and state police prepared for an advance into the north under the pretext of “border security“ towards Thuringia and Saxony; the various paramilitary units, including those of the Combat League, were involved. This put the Combat League in danger of losing its freedom of action in a very confusing situation and, in the event of a Reich ‘coup d’état’, having to leave the leadership to the right-wing conservative group.
From the end of October to the beginning of November, ongoing talks and exploratory discussions took place between the two rival camps on how to proceed. It became clear to the leadership of the Combat League that von Kahr and his followers did not want to commit to a joint plan for a Reich ‘coup d’état’. In fact, there were increasing signs that the crisis had already passed its peak and the chance of a radical overthrow was dwindling after the Reich government had deposed the two left-wing governments in Thuringia and Saxony and initiated a currency reform. The Combat League leadership was now under compulsion; it both wanted and needed to meet the high expectations for an imminent ‘strike’ that it had itself stirred among its followers. It was therefore decided to trigger a ‘coup d’état’ on their own initiative and sweep the right-conservative forces along with them.
A favorable opportunity seemed to present itself on November 8, when the ’triumvirate’ of Kahr, von Lossow and von Seißer as well as the State Premier, several ministers and influential conservative personalities came together for an event in Munich’s Bürgerbräu brewery. Hitler had the hall occupied and cordoned off in a raid-like manner, created silence by firing a pistol shot into the ceiling and then put pressure on the members of the triumvirate in an adjoining room to join the coup. Finally, the audience in the auditorium was informed of the ’consensus’ that had been reached: Hitler was to take over the leadership of the Reich government, Ludendorff was to become commander of a ’national army’, von Lossow Reich Defense Minister, von Seißer Police Minister and the former police chief Pöhner Bavarian State Premier. Von Kahr claimed the role of ’regent of the monarchy in Bavaria’.
Later that evening, nevertheless, von Kahr, von Lossow, and von Seißer succeeded in getting away from the Bürgerbräu. They publicly distanced themselves from the putsch that very night and began to initiate counteractions. This was all the easier because the coup plotters - with a few exceptions - had not succeeded in occupying the most important government buildings and barracks as planned. Meanwhile, the putschists held State Premier von Knilling and several Bavarian ministers, who were also in the Bürgerbräu, hostage; a number of Jewish citizens who were arrested in the city area were also declared hostages, as well as the first mayor and seven town councillors from the left-wing parties Communist Party of Germany (KPD), Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD), who were abducted from the town hall by force. All the captives were released again on November 9. The coup plotters also vandalized the editorial offices of the Social Democratic Munich Postand ’seized’ a large amount of paper currency from two printing facilities to pay their troops.
When it became clear after just a few hours that the Reichswehr and state police were loyal to the incumbent government, the putschists made one last attempt to perhaps turn the tide after all with an armed demonstration march into the city. At the ‘Feldherrnhalle’, they came across a barricade of the state police, and a gunfight developed during which four police officers, fifteen coup participants, and one innocent bystander were killed. The coup attempt had thus failed; several leaders managed to escape abroad, some were captured on the spot, others - such as Hitler - after a few days.
Since the Bavarian government had no interest in addressing the compromising background of the coup, they ensured that the trial against the coup leaders, which began in February 1924, became a farce and concluded in April with exceptionally lenient judgments. Hitler was given the opportunity to present himself in court as the future ’leader’ of the right-wing camp. During his subsequent period of detention, he learned from the failed coup and took appropriate action as a result, developing a pseudo-legal tactic for his second attempt to ’seize power’ in Germany.
